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Commentary
Paradoxes
in Making Friends of Enemies
Richard
Farson
It goes without saying,
of course, that the best way to avoid terrorists’ attacks is to
become less a target of their hostility. If we are to judge from
the sharply increased hostility that much of the rest of the world
feels toward us as a result of our invasion of Afghanistan, and
our one-sided support for Israel, our government has so far not
done too well in that department.
The short-lived
Office of Strategic Influence, with its announced policy of providing
disinformation did not help. Nor did the leak of the Pentagon report
on the changed policy with respect to our use of nuclear weapons,
naming seven countries including nuclear powers Russia and China
as well as Iran and North Korea, all countries that had been moving
toward better relations with the US. Even our allies were shocked.
Our foreign policies, mainly our War on Terrorism, continue to deepen
the hatred.
Having shot
itself in both feet, the administration must rely more on the special
office it created for advertising industry icon, Charlotte Beers.
She is charged with the task of using modern communication techniques
to create a positive image of America among the angry people of
the Middle East. Essentially, she must transform strongly held attitudes,
getting those who hate us come to like and respect us. Not an easy
assignment. Even though new money is being appropriated to enable
the Voice of America to reach more Arab countries, the attitudes
we want to change tend to be held tenaciously. But attitude shifts
are not impossible. Moreover they are not always gradual. They can
even move from one pole to the opposite—as we often witness in politics,
and among reformed individuals from all walks of life. Enemies can
quickly become friends, and vice versa.
In the pursuit
of those hearts and minds now locked in fundamentalist religions
and passionate nationalism, Ms. Beers may have to incorporate some
new strategies. What may make sense on Madison Avenue, may not work
to meet this new challenge. To sell the American brand of values
to our potential enemies she cannot rely only on the kinds of commercially
successful techniques that Proctor and Gamble might use to sell
soap. To create positive bonds between them and us she will probably
have to embrace a few paradoxes.
The fundamental
shift in thinking required for this task is to realize that direct
efforts to make them feel positively about us are of limited value.
Paradoxically, the task is not to get them to respect us, but
to get us to respect them. If we can accomplish that, then the
natural reciprocity of human relations will ultimately bring about
a similar response in the other.
We frequently
see this phenomenon in management. Bosses who operate to try to
get their people to like them are less effective than those who
operate so that they will like their people. This means, first,
they must not feel victimized by their staff members, and so must
take action to end any possible victimization. They do this by straight
talk to the employees. But it also means that they become engaged
with them, they get to know their people, because in most cases
familiarity does not breed contempt, but friendliness. It is hard
for employees not to come to like a boss who likes them. On the
other hand, no technique can hide the truth if bosses really don’t
like their subordinates. They will come to hate him for that.
That is
perhaps the main reason why we are hated. We simply don’t respect
these Middle Eastern people who seem so different, and so remote,
from us. This means, of course, that much of Ms. Beers efforts must
be directed at us, to provide the kind of information to
our leaders and our citizens that could increase our understanding
and consequently our respect, and yes, even perhaps our affection
and compassion, for these angry masses. Like the effective manager,
we need to both talk straight and offer friendly engagement.
Unfortunately
for Ms. Beers, warfare is always conducted by painting the face
of the enemy not just as hostile, but as evil, even subhuman. She
will be up against a powerful undermining force in the propaganda
that accompanies war fighting. The psychology employed to motivate
soldiers to fight an enemy, is obviously very different from the
psychology involved in creating bonds of understanding. But that
is the fundamental nature of a paradoxical strategy—the ability
to go in opposite directions at the same time.
We saw this
strategy exercised in the war in Afghanistan where we dropped bombs
and food at the same time. In a sense we do this with our diplomatic
efforts, which continue throughout warfare. Diplomats must be cautious,
skeptical, even wary and tough, but they do not, and cannot, share
the soldier’s view of the enemy as monsters. It is entirely possible
to operate on several levels of perception of the other. We do it
all the time. To some extent, attitudes are determined by the roles
we play and the situations in which we play them.
She might
keep in mind some other paradoxes as well. People tend to like
those whom they help, not those who help them. That truth runs
counter to the whole idea of humanitarian aid, which, of course,
we should not abandon in any case. Indeed, we should increase it.
But the positive effects of such aid on increasing their affection
for us are minor compared to how these people would feel about us
if they could help us. They will change their attitudes
toward us when they can have an impact on us, get us to understand
something about them, educate us, change us in some way. That is
why the Peace Corps works so well. It isn’t just the aid our program
gives. The volunteers return changed, and consequently those they
left behind in those countries are changed also.
It’s also
important to remember that we tend to lose respect for those
whom we can deceive. When we are successful in deceiving others
we tend not to see the best in them. Indeed, we lose respect not
only for the fooled individuals, but for people in general. Deception
ultimately damages the deceiver more than the deceived. Disinformation
backfires.
Finally,
she might consider that the more important a relationship, the
less skills and techniques matter. That is, efforts to build
bonds between people that are not grounded in genuine attitudes
are not likely to succeed. When one desires a lasting relationship
it must be built on authentic feelings.
In that
effort we may often not know exactly what to do, and feel vulnerable
because of it. But that is all right too. We felt vulnerable on
9//11 and even countries with whom we had been at odds liked us
better at that moment. It is not always a measure of strength to
know what to do. For example, not knowing how to have a romance
is what makes it a romance in the first place. If you always know
what to do, it’s not a romance, it’s a seduction.
Our relationships
with these Middle Eastern peoples are the most important we now
have. Our lives depend on them. We cannot risk a seduction.
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