The Inevitability and Desirability of Globalization
Host: Walter Anderson

Current Global Conflicts

(Participant) The last six messages above at first seem disjointed. But on rereading them, I think they show an interesting quality of good minds that are different but have learned to respect each other. It also seems to me that they are approaching the BIG ISSUES with nuances that would have been unlikely before 9/11. The world is changing rapidly, and many of our former accepted "truths" are no longer so "true".

Like all of you, my mind often churns into unfamiliar territory just before going to sleep. Here is one that I could not erase on waking and so--quite naturally(!)--I am going to unload it here.

Title: HOW PRESIDENT BUSH DECIDED TO WIN THE NEXT ELECTION BY SAVING OUR CIVILIZATION.

Over the weekend of Feb 1, 2003, President Bush was Born Again. He saw, in a full detail dream, that winning wars by weapons of total destruction could never end in victory. He also saw, and couldn't erase from his mind, that Saddam's arsenal of such weapons were simply a weak imitation of what his military might was about to unleash. Thereupon, he used his world-wide facilities of communication inviting all leaders to join him in forgoing further wars.

At this point, my dream (hallucination) got jumbled and I will spare you the details. But somehow most of the world leadership, and especially the middle eastern Muslims, saw a miracle revision in Bush's dangerous plans that foretold of rescuing the world from near destruction. A crazy scenario--but compared to what?

I trouble this hallowed space with such nonsense only because it seems to fit in with some of the overtones in our recent exchanges. In my mind, the world IS different now than before 9/11 even in the actual last minute world exchanges leading up to (or avoiding?) the Iraq war. I'll bet I am not the only one in our group, and perhaps thousands of others, that are experiencing similar, but hopefully better grounded, hallucinations.

(Participant) What does world war do to the march of globalization? Now that the administration has amazingly succeeded in bringing the American people into acceptance, if not approval, of a war with Iraq, it appears that war is inevitable. Saddam, knowing the invasion is coming, is not going to disarm. Our policy has put him in that double bind from the beginning. We all nurse the hope that it will be quick and easy. But I have seen no plausible scenario that supports that hope. The ones I do read about point to massive destabilization, not limited to the Middle East. Most predict a spread to other wars, both civil and international. And none forecast anything but decades long involvement.

One can't help but wonder what kind of world we will be making and remaking if this turns into the holocaust that some predict. The expansion of international markets, and the increased cooperation and communication among nations that has developed what we now call globalization surely will be altered. Or will it? Is the march of globalization so inexorable that it will continue at a meta level even as the world falls into widespread violence? Have we become so used to conflagrations (there are a hundred going on at any one time, I guess) that we can abide the escalation that is imminent? Might this war actually increase the speed of globalization?

(Participant) Dick: Your 1:60 asks the right questions and mirrors the thoughts of what I can't help but believing should be those of all sound-thinking Americans. But clearly they are not. The mystery to me, and I guess to you, is how could we as Americans become so blind to the inevitable catastrophe ahead?

I tried to express my concerns with a bit of whimsy in 1:57, but it was DOA. This discussion on Globalization and in fact almost all of our different topics for the past six months have been overshadowed by our concerns with Iraq without making a dent in our own thinking or having an influence on our national course of action.

Our world--and I believe that of the majority of others on this planet--really did change with the new millennium punctuated by 9/11. Many have tried to capture that change but I haven't found any explanations that are adequate. You have certainly tried! Do you think that our misadventure in outer space while flying in a 20-year-old craft is a metaphor worth examining?

(Walter Anderson) The events of 9/11 slowed down some globalization processes such as international tourism, and accelerated others such as the volume of information transfer--the period just after 9/11 showed the greatest spike ever in international communication via e-mail, phone, etc. I would expect the Iraq war to have similar two-way impacts, while the larger process of globalization continue.

(Participant) In discussing the case for war in Iraq, and the dangers we run, Tom Friedman writes in today's NY Times: "The unstated logic is that the real threat to open societies comes from all the angry young men and women being produced by the misgovernment, backwardness and extremism emanating from that part of the world. And, if that anger results in another 9/11 it will mean the end of the open society as we know it, and globalization as we know it."

(Walter Anderson) I haven't read that particular column yet, but Friedman has been quite hawkish on the war. I don't doubt that another major terrorist attack on the US could have a traumatic and explosive effect. It's not too clear what he means by the end of the open society as we know it, and globalization as we know it, but if he means progress toward some sort of a civilized and peaceful world order he's probably right.

(Participant) Yes, Friedman has come to like the "audacity" of our administration, but he seems to see the downside, or maybe he wasn't reflecting his own views. The column was about how the people in America are not at all supportive of the war, despite the polls. In any case, I'm one who thinks that the war will set some positive aspects of globalization back, even though I suppose it will produce others. There is always some positive fallout from wars.

World opinion, even popular US opinion, about the war was not changed much by Powell's case at the UN yesterday, even as the acceptance of war's inevitability spreads. I wonder if that division will grow large enough to stop our imperialist strategy. Imperialism is not my idea of the way globalization should develop.

(Participant) I keep tying America's world leadership to the direction of globalization. I can't help but think that the decisions we are making now will significantly alter the events of the future toward the most undesirable global responses. The dangers of the erosion of our moral leadership, once high, is still not appreciated by the American public. Just think, when 9/11 happened the world's sympathy poured out to us. If we attack Iraq, and then are attacked ourselves by terrorists, they will say, "We warned you. You had it coming."

(Walter Anderson) OK, then, how are people in the current global context influencing power elites--through what organizations, mechanisms? We all know the pat answer about consumer buying power isn't sufficient--although it can sometimes be harnessed effectively by boycotts (South Africa, for example). The traditional channel is through government policy-making, and that continues to be an important one, but governments, as I've pointed out, no longer have a monopoly on governance (if they ever did). The other kinds of channels that have opened up, often quite effectively, are the non-governmental ones--the environmental ngo’s, the Seattle protests, the land mine movement. People who are improvising in these ways are in a sense the pioneers of globalization-era politics. And I'd have to add regretfully that Bin Laden and Co. have also shown a remarkable flair for making a difference through exploitation of new possibilities for action in a global context.

(Participant) Wendell Berry's full page essay in today's NY Times talks a lot about globalization, particularly the way in which the US National Security Strategy is related to it. Take a look if you can.

(Participant) It seems to me that #89 and #90 we are speculating about forces that need some kind of global overlook--whether you call it global governance or not. I just came from a two day meeting on demography and a similar need for global management of population was also discussed with more seriousness than I had seen before.

No one likes or would choose more management of their affairs until they understood conditions which demand it. I for one am not happy with a war that may unilaterally be started by one government - even though it is mine (!)--and I fully recognize the booby traps of having a global organization with that power. But I am not happy with the existing alternative.

(Walter Anderson) All kinds of political players on the field at the moment: US and Iraq playing old-fashioned military power politics, UN and NATO trying in different ways to assert themselves as supernational authorities, Al-Qaeda playing international terrorism, international peace movements staging protest marches and sending petitions flying through cyberspace. And God knows what the outcome will be.

(Participant) What a rapid shift in global attitudes toward the US . 9/11 saw an international outpouring of sympathy and friendship. Today , even if we are able to get Russia, China, Germany and France to reluctantly go along, an attack on our mainland will be met with, "Well, you asked for it!"

(Walter Anderson) Quote from a columnist in today's SF Chronicle: "Globalization is about more than free trade. What we are witnessing is the birth of a grassroots global democracy. To emphasize our membership in this new global society, many protesters around the world will be carrying the UN. flag, a fitting symbol for a new era."

(Participant) I watched Colin Powell this morning at the UN via TV. His great performance stirred up a current interest of mine--decision process. As most of you know by now, I have become a perhaps over-enthusiastic advocate of deliberative non adversarial decision making rather than the either/or yes/no kind of decision process that is deeply imbedded in our culture.

It seemed to me that Secretary Powell had as many problems with advocating war as do many of us here, and also many at the UN. But the format of debate there is largely either/or. Again with my prejudices, I thought I detected Powell’s preference for discussing some of the many alternatives to sudden war, e.g. stricter time limits to further action by Saddam, more complete control of the Iraq boundaries, more allies helping to monitor Iraq's trade in weapons, etc. Some of these alternatives were also being voiced by other delegates.

Do any of you see (alas, as an academic question now but perhaps worth some consideration) any honorable and effective possibilities short of war that might have emerged from more creative discussion?

(Participant) Yes, if discussion of them had only begun two or more years ago. It gets harder and harder to find a viable alternative as our government moves, step by step, to foreclose them all.

(Participant) Again yes, Ray, I agree that it may be too late to avoid a war--but there will certainly be last minute bargaining. And if there is, the only way we can back out is to develop some genuine and viable reasons for doing so and that will also gain for us some additional allies.

I also agree that this is playing unrealistic games, but just IF there were to be one last summit meeting and I could organize the agenda, I would suggest the following:

* Discussion of goals: not just destroying all weapons of mass destruction, but who will be responsible for governing Iraq, what specific plans for government (not just the mantra of democracy), what will be the cost and who pays, and many other critical items.

* What are the alternatives to war to achieve the goals: e.g., blockade of essentials, including food (consideration of humanity in a temporary food blockade vs. massive military activity). And there are surely other alternatives that haven't been raised.

* The format for such discussions would be more like a facilitated seminar than the current format of UN meetings.

I admit that all who have had much more direct experience in international affairs at the summit will correctly say that the above is unrealistic. But I would counter that starting another war against Iraq without a more carefully planned long range set of goals does not seem high on the definition of realistic.

And even if the above pattern of discussions fail to avoid war, the rationale for starting it just might become clearer and might also win some more allies--and even some more agreement here at home.

(Walter Anderson) I recall being at an interesting gathering at La Jolla ten-plus years ago when General Max Thurman described in considerable detail the complete overhaul of military doctrine that took place after Vietnam--aimed, of course, at not having any more Vietnams. There are signs that this hasn't now been completely discarded--note, for example, the massive pre-invasion buildup to get away from the stumble-in-and-escalate-later process. But there are also signs that the current administration hasn't really learned the lesson. In particular, I think they banked on strong post-911 public support and are somewhat stunned by the protest. I notice also, in today's NY Times, a report that Rumsfeld and others are looking harder at some of the ways that an invasion could go wrong. I wouldn't build this into a prediction that the administration is about to change its course, but I do suspect (and of course hope) there is some deep rethinking going on.

(Participant) Harlan, I appreciate the kindness of your disagreement. I'll try to elaborate on my thinking here. I don't necessarily believe that public opinion can't sway a leader, but how much public opinion will sway a leader depends on both the magnitude of the public opinion and on the leader himself.

I think there is a tendency to overlook that whoever occupies a "leadership" position has both a personal agenda and a personal dynamic. For Bush, his personal agenda might be something as mundane as vengeance or wanting to improve the financials of his buddies--we can't know what is. His personal dynamic is hidden as well. Is he driven by greed, power, self image (as a hero perhaps), living up to dad, etc.

This makes it very difficult to determine how much affect public opinion will have on what he decides. Based on his public actions to date, I suspect (and it is purely speculation on my part) that Bush is not easily swayed once he decides to do something. His "moral" convictions seem to be strongly held and as long as he feels that he has the support of those in the country who share that moral code, he might not consider that opposition to his course is anything other than misguide thinking at best or immorality at worst.

One of the most puzzling things that has occurred in re the possible war against Iraq has been Powell's about face. He gives the appearance of integrity and he was initially opposed to such a war. What has happened, I wonder, to cause him to be so much more publicly supportive and active?

To some extent, it has been Powell's actions that led me to the scenario I described. There is so much attention being given to Iraq that either the administration is nuts or there is a major policy direction being implemented.

(Participant) Is any one else as annoyed as I am at Bush's boast that he will bring democracy to Iraq--a boast that he made possible by trashing a constitutional policy that only Congress can declare war and transferred it to the Oval Office. I consider that ploy worthy of Saddam himself. And what saddens me is how little opposition or anger this stirred up.

(Participant) I agree completely, Walt. And I have little doubt that the plan is indeed what is mainly motivating the administration in the Iraq adventure. First in a series.

A La Jolla acquaintance, Jack White, has just co-authored an op-ed piece with technology expert Doug Ramsey, questioning whether or not this will be the second American century. They point out that the administration's confidence in America's supremacy may be short-lived, with China in the wings. They think this could be the Chinese century.

Which leads me to fear that the current administration's actions supporting its larger plan may turn out to be the beginning of the end for American dominance. We have already lost our favored position in the minds of the world's population, and we may lose our economic and technological edge as well.

(Participant) Earlier this week, an e-mail correspondent suggested I check into http://www.hyperreal.org/~dana

I did so, and found there a remarkable collection of photographs of the crowds recently demonstrating against war in cities all over the world. The printout chews up 31 pages. The photos are of varying quality and taken from different distances; not all the placards are readable. But a good many of those that are decipherable are pouring scorn, ridicule, and vitriol on the President of the United States. That, of course, induced a Thought:

Whoever wrote and edited that famous strategy paper about preemptive war doubtless failed to point up in the Oval Office that it might expose George W. Bush personally to a global wave of caricatures and insults. And indeed many, perhaps most, of the demonstrators don't seem to be demonstrating against the United States; they are vilifying a particular group of contemporary US leaders.

The distinction between leaders and people is clearly in focus when we hear about Iraq from Washington. A similar distinction about the relationship between US political leaders and the American people is unlikely to have been stressed in the intelligence briefings at the White House.

(Walter Anderson) Both Don's and Harlan's comments serve to concretize something I feel about the current moment in world history, and which I have probably failed to communicate clearly--which is that we are truly in the midst of a momentous change, and nobody quite seems to get that. Many (probably most) business leaders fail in their own ways to get it, and the current administration is failing in another way. I should add that I think a lot of the good guys have their own styles of deliberately underestimating the force and momentum of globalization. I don't pretend to get it fully either, but at least I have a sense of moving into heretofore unexplored territory, a time that may hold many surprises. I only hope that some of them will be pleasant ones.

(Participant) Walt asked for some thoughts about the future of NATO in world politics. I happened to be the US ambassador to NATO (my presidential commission described the job as "permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, for the time being") during a transitional time (1965-69) when (a) NATO figured out how to design its way around France's military noncooperation, and (b) the North Atlantic Council also became a primary venue for political consultation--especially, in those days, on arms control and how to make peace with the Soviet Union.

The arrangement about France worked, and works to this day. "Les Quatorze" (all the then members except France) decided to meet as the Defense Planning Committee, which acts as the North Atlantic Alliance's political board of directors on all military matters, and supervises NATO's Supreme Allied Commander (then and always an American four-star general).

In recent years, NATO has been drawn into military operations outside the traditional NATO defense perimeter--which extends from Hawaii to the eastern frontier of Turkey, but didn't until recently include the Balkans. I can imagine further future redrawing of the NATO perimeter, especially into the Middle East and across the Mediterranean, or even farther afield as a projection of naval power. But I doubt that this will be done in principle ahead of time. It's more likely to happen, as NATO's involvement in Bosnia did, as an urgent military requirement that produces a last-minute political decision--in the North Atlantic Council if the French are on board, in the Defense Planning Committee if they aren't.

Both the limits and the relevance of NATO in the current Iraq issue are reasonably clear. If Iraq were to invade Turkey, all NATO allies are committed to do something about it together; but nobody is attributing that degree of wackiness to Saddam Hussein. Yet Turkey will inevitably be involved, and a good many of the allies will want to provide backup equipment and supplies. That conundrum has been debated among the allies in NATO during February, but no one has proposed a mobilization of forces under the NATO flag.

So if the balloon goes up, each country will do what it's moved to do: The Netherlands, Italy, and Spain will help in practical ways, and some of the Eastern Europeans, especially Poland, will want to be seen helping somehow. No NATO consensus decision would be required, so the military quiescence of Germany and France would not create a crisis in NATO.

(More on the political consultation role in another comment.)

(Participant) I won't rehearse here the (to me, fascinating) story of NATO's role as a transatlantic forum for political consultation, and how that role was reinforced and codified in the 1960s. I wrote that story in a book more than three decades ago (NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain, Harper and Row, 1970).

In 2003 it's still clear that NATO remains a primary venue for transatlantic bargaining on major political and security matters--whether or not the engagement of NATO forces (under command of NATO's Supreme Commander) is envisaged or appropriate.

It's not the only such venue, of course. Transatlantic discussion about farm subsidies, trade, intellectual property, telecommunications, scientific cooperation, monetary regulation, environmental protection, cultural exchange, and many other subjects is part of the work of global multilaterals and specialized agencies.

But NATO is still the prime political symbol of "the transatlantic bargain," as is seen in the anxiety of so many European countries, especially those recently disenthralled from communist rule, to join up.

I tried in 1970 to capture the essence of the transatlantic bargain, calling it "a strong presumption of cooperation in the event of trouble--or in the event of negotiations that affect all the members." That presumption has been torpedoed by a long and now-familiar series of U.S. actions to walk away from agreements or near-agreements in a variety of fields, and above all by an American tone of voice that has seemed repeatedly to say, "If we can't get our way on this, we'll simply act on our own." It has also been torpedoed by reactive efforts, especially by France and Germany, to frustrate cooperation with the United States. The venues for these arguments are many. But they all show forth as a split in the North Atlantic Alliance and its presumption of cooperation.

The separate breakdowns of trust in many transatlantic relationships are bound to erode the transatlantic bargain itself--and NATO, which is both its symbol and an important part of its substance too. It's by no means all our fault. But the United States is, as Dean Rusk used to say, "the fat boy in the canoe." When we shift our weight it makes a disproportionate difference. The fat boy has been shifting his weight a lot recently, often without much notice to the other passengers. And the boat we are in with our European allies is taking on a dangerous amount of water.

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