The Inevitability and Desirability of Globalization
Host: Walter Anderson

Possible Scenarios for Relations with the Middle East

(Walter Anderson) Glad to see a recurrence of the dialogue theme here. The project mentioned in my 1:96 is definitely structured as a series of dialogues rather than debates.

Also I should point out that, as we talk, globalization is happening. The papers today say that tomorrow there may be ten million people demonstrating worldwide against the war--an event of a sort that has never happened before, a powerful expression of global public opinion.

Now, protests aren't really dialogues either. They tend to get simplistic and bombastic, and always have a mix of very dialogue-minded people and destructive troublemakers. But they make a heartfelt demand that the leaders do something more than throw bombs at one another.

I propose that we try to do something new and creative in this conference, which is see if we can construct a set of scenarios of what kind of a global order (or disorder, if you prefer) may emerge out of the present situation. Keep in mind that a set of scenarios should consider plausible alternative futures, not merely what you want or expect to happen. We should consider visions both benign and ghastly of possible outcomes of a war, visions of what might unfold if we somehow avoid proceeding with the invasion. And we should remember that the men in suits are no longer the only makers of global policy.

(Walter Anderson) I strongly recommend the article "After Iraq" by Nicholas Lemann in the current (Feb. 17 - 24) issue of the New Yorker, which describes the Administration scenario for what happens after the (assumed) clean victory in Iraq. Note that it is essentially about nation-state power politics, mentions no intergovernmental organizations and no ngo's other than Islamic terrorist groups.

(Participant) Walter, in the spirit of your 1:115, here is a "scenario". I've kept it as brief as I could. It does not represent my "desire", simply a logical predication of what events might possibly follow if the proposition becomes real.

Proposition: Saddam is overthrown, USA establishes a military presence in Iraq for the next several years.

1. USA will be perceived as an action oriented world presence, not swayed by the opinions of others whose agenda is potentially inimical to USA interests.

2. Mid-east leaders will fear their own overthrow by USA if they continue to harbor and support "terrorists" overtly or covertly. This fear will lead them to crack down on such groups within their borders, possibly repressing their own populations even further.

3. Such repression gives rise to the possibility of these leaders (whose ONLY goal is to remain in power) coming under attack from their own populations leading to their possible overthrow - possibly of benefit to the populations.

4. Mid-east becomes even less stable, in which case USA has a significant strategic advantage by having bases and personnel in Iraq, from which to launch strikes against other countries in the region.

5. France, Germany and Russia are exposed as having supplied Iraq with illicit arms technology. This will weaken their falsely claimed moral high ground and cause rifts in the EU.

6. Trade between Iraq and neighboring countries (Syria, Jordan, Iran, etc.) will improve.

7. Oil flow to the world will be increased with some oversight (read control and power) by USA (an economic advantage).

8. EU allies and holdouts will profit or not from their alliance with USA, further weakening the EU and advantaging USA in domination of world markets, further spreading the American mode.

9. China and India will view our actions in such a way as to justify their own incursions into other territories.

10. The halls of power will narrow down to fewer players over the next 20 years. As the real players dwindle in number the world will become politically more global (i.e. fewer nations of importance)

11. The number of different government systems will decrease.

(Walter Anderson) Kip, thanks for an excellent and thoughtful contribution to the scenario-building exercise. Could you say a bit more about what you mean in point 11?

I just read an interesting story in the NY Times about world public opinion emerging as the "other superpower."

(Participant) The elements of the current situation that are seldom brought into analysis are that the stated purpose of the impending war is disarmament of Iraq, and that only by disarming can he avoid a conflagration. But since August, Saddam has also heard another message loud and clear from Bush, that we are going to take military action to end his regime, no matter what. He sees the troops massing on his border. And he knows that Bush's overall strategic plan is imperialistic takeover, beginning with Iraq. This plan is also not getting much play in our press, but is certainly listened to in the Middle East. That contradictory message places Saddam in what we psychologists call a "double bind"--damned if you do, and damned if you don't.

That is, he is in the untenable position of having his defenses subject to inspection by the same force that threatens to invade anyway, and ultimately to reshape the entire region in the US image. Small wonder that he plays a similar contradictory game-showing what he can, and keeping what he needs to defend Iraq against invasion.

(Participant) The only scenario I can imagine that will possibly avert war would be if by some miracle Bush, Rice, Rove, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Co. recognize the developing global anti-war sentiment, as evidenced by the weekend's massive demonstrations, as insurmountable by simply staying on message, and decide to save face, settle for disarmament, disavow our previous determination to make a regime change, and postpone activation of the larger strategic plan until terrorism and North Korea have been addressed.

So Bush might say something like, "Our goal all along has been to disarm a potentially dangerous Iraq. Our military contingent of 200,000 troops in the area is now ready to police that long-standing UN demand. We mean business. Further, so there is no mistake, let me make one thing clear. Iraq should undergo a regime change, because the Iraqi people are tortured and repressed and Saddam has dreams of conquest. Practically every nation in the world believes that. I stand with the UN Security Council and the other Arab nations on the way to cripple this despot is to demand and ensure full disarmament. If Saddam fully complies with the UN demand, keeping only defensive weapons, in a rapid and entirely credible manner, I will not also demand to the UN that we seek, with military action, a regime change. So far he has not. If he continues to flout the UN demands, he and his regime will be deposed by us, militarily, as a way to make certain that there are no offensive weapons available to him. This radical change in his behavior must take place immediately, or he faces war. Throwing the inspectors a few crumbs is insufficient. He must disarm. A completely de-fanged Saddam is not a danger to the world, only to his own people. Once his people fully recognize his despotism, they may rise against him. We would give our support to such efforts. But if he complies with UN disarmament demands, we will not enter militarily. In the great tradition of our nation, we are determined that whatever military action is taken fulfills the criteria of a just war, with full backing by our allies."

If our message to Saddam is a credibly consistent one, not a contradictory one, then Saddam might disarm. This far into the military scenario, that is doubtful, but possible.

(Participant) I'm not sure that making a lot of noise will necessarily translate into any claim to superpower. Thus far the number of people worldwide protesting the war represent such a statistically small portion of the population that they can simply be ignored by government. Power from the Latin poder --to be able--comes down to the ability to actually do something. While in a democracy, 51% of the voters can theoretically bring about a change, from a practical point of view it doesn't always work so neatly. Bush only needs to win the next election and then he's done anyway. Until he believes that his reelection is in danger of being lost, he has no reason at all to pay any attention to a few million people in Britain, Rome, Germany - or even in the USA. The leaders in those countries are in much the same boat. Until a truly significant portion (25-30%) of their population expresses real discontent with official policy they are safe in their power.

(Walter Anderson) The "superpower" metaphor is probably overstating the case, but I would not want to underestimate the importance of public opinion, especially on a global scale. I think we're looking at something new here and nobody really knows how it may proceed--especially if we move into active warfare--or what impact it might have.

(Participant) Kip: I agree that the number of people protesting the war, both at home and abroad, are still statistically small. But I would be less sure that they can be simply ignored. Even if the war goes as smoothly as the Gulf War and as is being implied by President Bush (which I think is far from a good bet) it will almost certainly result in a far larger number of casualties. There could also be other fall-outs from a much more fragile world than ever before.

(Participant) I think that Walt, with professional reserve, has expressed this just about right.

(Participant) Richard, I'll vote for you (120) to replace Bush right away. Please do.

Kip, I think you seriously underestimate the actual consequences of "globalization." I think Walt has it right. Your reasoning is impressive, but it undervalues the effect of culture and public opinion. What is going to happen is going to be significantly affected by the public judgment in the various societies involved; for some that judgment will be limited to the ruling elite, for some the general citizenry.

The attitudes of the countries of the Middle East are quite united. It will affect the way the US is treated, no matter how "powerful" we are. Power, it seems to me, depends more on the ability of leaders to engender agreements among their populace than you give it credit for. (I still admire the closely reasoned comments you make to this conference, even when I think you are partially wrong.)

(Participant) I think the "global" demonstrations may be much more influential than some of us give them credit for. The fact that so many governments seem to support the US government in its determination to barrel ahead may well mean that they're thinking more about their future relations with a superpower than about pleasing their constituents. (That's "statesmanship" in their political vocabulary.)

There's a lesson here from the opposition in the US to the War in Vietnam. For a while it looked like a fringe movement featuring naked students and costumed adults. But it turned out that for every demonstrator in the streets, there were half a dozen, then a dozen, then hundreds of respectable citizens who were also having reservations about US policy. When in 1970 I heard my older brother, a vice president of Citibank, tell me he had concluded the Vietnam War didn't make any sense to him, I knew that our withdrawal from that enterprise was only a matter of time.

We then had half a million troops committed in Vietnam. We are close to having 200,000 committed in the Persian Gulf. There are all kinds of "face" issues involved now, as there were then, on top of all the substantive issues at stake. But if it doesn't make sense, it doesn't make sense, and beefing up our commitment doesn't improve the sense-making quotient.

The US public may be marginally prepared for war, as long as it's quick and relatively painless. But most of our best friends abroad (I'm speaking of peoples, not governments) aren't even ready for a blitzkrieg. And most Americans aren't ready for the ten-year aftermath--especially in the absence of evidence that their government knows what it would do with military success.

In these circumstances, I think we--and our government--should take the street demonstrations, another symptom of globalization, more seriously than we (and our government) did in the Sixties and early Seventies.

(Participant) Walt asked for scenarios. Here's one, offbeat enough to be possible, if not probable:

1. In the midst of all the diplomatic uncertainty about war-or-no-war with Iraq, a terrorist group pulls off a major attack in the United States.

Your pick of targets is as good as mine, but (if I were a terrorist just now) I would pick a non-obvious target, not in Washington--but something symbolic like the Statue of Liberty, or that inverted U in St. Louis, or the French Quarter in New Orleans, or the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco.

2. The threat to "homeland security" thus revealed, the President turns the government's resources toward other such threats, suspends for the time being the immediacy of an attack on Iraq, pulls back some but not all of the U.S. troops in the area, and focuses State and local governments, and the people's attention, on finding and frustrating terrorists at home. (This leads to much more acute contradictions between war-on-terrorism and civil liberties, but that's another scenario.)

3. Our European allies, shocked by this second attack on the U.S. and anxious to help (and to be seen helping), mobilize their intelligence and police assets to mesh with America's--and draw a sigh of relief that they don't, for the time being, have to choose between endorsing or frustrating U.S. actions in the Middle East.

4. Some Arab nations, provided with a window of opportunity to deal with Iraq without seeming to be pawns of the U.S., begin to plan regime change in Iraq in ways that may well require Western support, but will make it possible for the Western support to be called in on Arab initiative.

[This scenario can be spun out in much more detail, but the general idea is clear: a pothole in the road we're on, big enough to jolt us (and the Europeans, and the Arabs, and the UN, and the world) onto a more constructive track.]

(Participant) Harlan, I am fascinated by your scenario. I would have a couple of qualifications. First, while 9/11 was an amazing feat, its scale was unintended and unpredictable. It would take quite an effort to achieve something of that scale again. My guess is that it will be something like the Bali explosion, which wouldn't bring down the Statue of Liberty or the Golden Gate Bridge.

Second, I suspect that if the terrorist attack happened now, there would be no outpouring of sympathy for the US that characterized 9/11. More likely, they would say, "Well, you asked for it!" World sentiment toward us has changed completely in the past year.

I love the very creative idea of our supporting an Arab initiative.

Kip, Powell's about face happened at the time he was sandbagged by the French at a meeting that was supposed to be about something else, but he was apparently asked an embarrassing question about Iran. He was humiliated, and emerged a hawk. Which makes me worry about him.

Don, as you well know, Bush is not the first president to circumvent or deceive Congress about going to war. Truman did it by not calling Korea a war, and Johnson did it by lying about the Gulf of Tonkin "incident". Harlan probably can think of others.

(Participant) Dick: The previous circumventions were done with more subtlety and without the public acquiescence of the opposing party. I really believe this is a different circumnavigation and a blatant grab for power.

(Walter Anderson) I was getting ready to log on here with four (very incomplete) scenarios when I read Harlan's, which I find fascinating and imaginative and also deeply disturbing. (As I sit here at my computer I glance out the window at the Golden Gate bridge, as I have done many times since 911, and am relieved to see it still there.)

Anyway, here are my candidates. We really don't have the time or the research and facilitation resources for a full-scale scenario-building exercise (might be interesting to organize one at La Jolla sometime) so these are quite simplistic, really just outlines:

1. War and easy victory, followed by nation-building. We roll through Iraq in a few days, overpower them with high-tech military, and move in for the occupation. EU and other opposition is muted, and other members of the world community pitch in on the rebuilding process. A sequel is increasing movement in the Arab/Islamic world toward some democratization.

2. War and catastrophe. Saddam destroys his oil fields, unleashes attacks on his own population to heighten the general disaster image. Terrorism attacks on the US and allies increase. The war winds on, with growing protest and dissent. US eventually wins, and finds itself in a cesspool of political squabbling. NATO is in a shambles, the UN unable to exert leadership. Progress toward globalization of democracy and human rights halts.

3. War avoided, desirable scenario--I can see several possible ways this could happen, including Harlan's wild card--and strong movement toward better forms of conflict-resolution in the future.

4. War avoided, worst-case scenario (a la Administration) of Saddam amassing WMD, Iraq serving as a staging-ground for new waves of terrorism.

What I suggest we try to consider here, in fleshing out these (and possibly other) plausible futures, are the implications for global norms, global culture, global economy.

(Participant) Yes, Don, I agree that this case is different, and in some ways worse. But, regrettably, America no longer expects the Senate to declare war. I doubt that most people even know that power is given to the Senate by the Constitution. I don't think the Senate was brought into the decisions with respect to Grenada, Panama or Kosovo either, was it?

With respect to our scenario-building, I think certain misunderstandings are creeping into our thinking and we are using terms that we should be defining more carefully. I don't think we've had an intelligent global discussion of "weapons of mass destruction". The only weapons that seem to qualify as WMD are biological, chemical and nuclear. Articles I have seen suggest that in the case of current capabilities of biological and chemical weapons, they are of severely limited power, about the same as a single bomb. Nuclear weapons are in a somewhat different category, and so far have not been used by anybody but us. But even nuclear holocausts, such as Nagasaki, are not significantly different, in the horror and devastation allied forces perpetrated against civilians, than the fire-bombing of, say, Dresden. And as far as horror is concerned, there are many weapon candidates--napalm, flame throwers, land mines, etc.

We also succumb to the standard practice of painting the face of the enemy as satanically villainous. The evidence from the NY Times is that the Kurds (Iraqis) killed by gas in the Iran/Iraq war were not killed by Saddam's forces, but by Iran's. Saddam did use gas in that war, but it was in the course of battle. Not as an effort to police his own people. I'm prepared to believe Saddam is a cruel despot, but I think we must be careful to use measured statements.

I'm sure the anti-American forces could use our own behavior to paint such villainous pictures of us--and they wouldn't have to lie. We incarcerate a larger percentage of our population than any other nation except China. We torture people in our interrogations, even including such outrages as ramming a broomstick into the anus of a prisoner, rupturing his colon. Our police often kill innocents. We employ the death penalty, a practice that appalls Europeans, and others around the world. How many jailhouse rapes do you think our authorities have committed, or allowed, that might be described by defectors?

A "quick" war will only be quick, if we manage to kill tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of Iraqis in the first few days of bombings. The Shock and Awe war plan does just that. In the brief Gulf war we killed, according to our estimates, about 85,000 Iraqis. It was so "quick" we hardly could believe it was over. Nobody expects this one to go quite that quickly. We seldom acknowledge that the recipients of our blitzkriegs suffer greatly. We lost no one in the Kosovo war, but many were nevertheless lost. How many women are widowed or children are orphaned, but not represented in the death statistics? I think we need a better term than "quick" in referring to the impending war, indicating the real horror that will be inflicted.

(Participant) A wonderful challenge, Walt! I confess to a temptation to focus on number 3 and try to find a way to make it happen.

In Harlan's scenario, step #2 depends, does it not, on the perceived source of the terrorist resources employed in the attack? Should they appear to come from sources completely unrelated to Iraq, I can see the sequence evolving as suggested. If there is even the smallest thread to link those resources to Saddam, then it seems likely that Bush's counter-attack would come within a few days.

(Walter Anderson) There are different approaches to, and philosophies of, scenario-building, but as I see it the main reason for doing them is that (a) nobody can really foresee the future, and (b) we have to think hard about it anyway.

Some of the best practitioners caution against creating a set of scenarios and then picking your favorite--instead they urge that you try to think what you would do (or in this case what US policy might be) in each case, regarding them all as equally probable.

We don't have to play by those rules, but I do think it would be worthwhile to give some serious effort to fleshing out no. 4--unless there is nobody in this conference who can summon up a credible belief in the Munich analogy, even as a sort of role-playing exercise.

(Participant) Ray: I guess I was assuming, perhaps too easily, that Saddam Hussein & Co. are too busy just now with their own "homeland defense" to mount an ambitious act of terrorism in the United States. Besides, overtly provoking us in that fashion (and it would be extremely careless for Iraq's leaders to believe that no Iraqi fingerprints would show) would upset the whole thrust of Iraq's diplomacy so far, which has been designed to divide the NATO alliance and deprive us of a broad "coalition of the willing" in the UN.

For Iraq to attack us first would thus be a bonanza for the Bush Administration--as the attack on Pearl Harbor was for FDR. America's war wouldn't then have to be "preemptive" or "preventive," it could just be plain old retaliation for an outrageous attack on the U.S.--which would swing most or all of the doubters, in American opinion and in foreign chancelleries, over to support for the United States.

The Iraqi leadership is bright enough to figure this out. That's why, in my scenario, the terrorist outrage is committed by an Al Qaeda (or some other network) unconnected with the Iraqi regime.

(Walter Anderson) Looking for some meat to put on the bones of what I'll call the "no war worst case" scenario, I read William Safire's column in today's NYT. Some quotes:

"Saddam is probably working on germs and poison gases and maybe even nukes."

"Iraqi weapons could someday obliterate New York."

"Saddam harbors in Baghdad terrorists trained by and affiliated with Al Qaeda."

All of this is part of his attack on what he calls "yes-but" critics (of which I'm one) who recognize the shortcomings of Saddam but don't accept war as the best means to deal with them. It also, however, points toward what a lot of people believe to be a plausible scenario of what will happen if the US does not proceed with the invasion and the "regime change."

(Participant) One of the problems with most scenario building is that it is vulnerable to the employment of logic that is rational. Seldom are paradoxes and unintended consequences built in. For example, those of us who thought from the beginning that an invasion of Iraq would be a dreadful mistake bought into the idea that pushing a seemingly reluctant Bush to submit his idea to the UN might be a way to make sure that it wouldn't happen. Instead of our simply rejecting the idea outright, by giving it official consideration by that body, we legitimized the idea of war, and now we are stuck with it as the likely scenario, even though I suspect that most of the people of the world still don't think it wise, under any current circumstances. We painted ourselves into a corner. And who would have thought that George W. Bush would strengthen the UN? That may indeed be the outcome. In any case, we can safely predict that there will be unintended consequences of any scenario we build, and some of them, paradoxically, will be just the opposite of our intentions.

In the scenarios provided here, however, almost all of what we predict are unintended consequences, mostly bad. Invade Iraq, increase terrorism, mobilize Arab hatred for the US, etc.

For me, the key to this whole global episode is still Israel. Our neglecting that issue for as long as we have, and now shelving it further while we conduct a war and nation-building adventure in Iraq, has produced more militant and aggressive actions by Israel. The consequence is a decided increase in hostility toward Israel by Europeans and others, threatening its very existence. Bush, by approving Sharon's actions, and going along with his pro-Israel neocon advisors has actually endangered Israel. One scenario, written about in the current New Yorker, is that our invasion of Iraq will force us to do something to bring peace to the Israelis and Palestinians just to quiet the angry Arab world. I wonder if Bush will have the ability to turn his attention that way, given the other items on his post-war agenda.

(Participant) Harlan: I agree that Saddam is smart enough not to attack us. What I fear is that the identity of the responsible party may not be apparent, in which case the Bush administration would likely assume that it was connected in some way to Iraq. In short, the situation would not be in Saddam's control. I agree that serious attention to Walt's scenario #4 will likely be useful. I'll try to help.

Scenario #4--No War, Worst Case:

(#1, in jest: Dick would be terribly frustrated!)

The U.S. would still desire regime change in Iraq, and with direct force foreclosed, would seek it through other means. These would include:

1) Activity by the CIA's Special Operations Group.

2) More extensive and favorable diplomatic overtures to other middle-eastern states, seeking their favor and trying to build a strong anti-Saddam coalition with extensive Arab participation.

3) More constructive efforts and more money directed toward Afghanistan.

4) A different approach toward the Palestine - Israeli conflict--though just HOW different I haven't yet figured out.

5) Something--I don't know what--to do with Egypt, which needs attention but I don't know of what kind.

(Walter Anderson) Something becoming increasingly clear, just over the last few days, is the controversy between two models of global order--Pax Americana vs. multicentralism. And it's also increasingly clear, as presidential hopefuls began to be heard from, that this is a domestic controversy as well--likely to be a major (if not the major) theme in future US elections.

(Participant) Another scenario. Perhaps too much to my liking, but I believe as realistic as any of the others.

Pres. Bush hears two messages: 1) attacking Iraq will lose more potential allies in the war against terrorism than he had anticipated; 2) the size and power of the troops which are now poised to attack Iraq have resulted in Saddam's decision to ship the bulk of his weapons abroad and giving credit to this "strategy" on our part is a plausible boast for removing his immediate threat of attack.

This sudden shift away from a threatened attack will open the door for Pres. Bush to inaugurate talks with most of the Muslim world and virtually all of the western world to form partnership roles for getting rid of Saddam and forming a team to "rehabilitate" Iraq into a prosperous and peaceful nation.

The weakest link in this not overly sturdy scenario is Bush's own weakness in changing his mind and listening to advice he doesn't like.

(Participant) Don, apropos of your optimistic scenario, James Goldsborough, in his column this morning, quoted Lord Keynes, "When I am wrong, I change my mind." Keynes said to a questioner. "What do you do?"

(Participant) While Saddam may not launch any terrorist attacks against USA, I think there are other players whose interests might be well served by such acts.

(Participant) Yes indeed! And that is what makes the "reality" of Saddam's links to Al-Qaeda important. Those links may be real, or they may be only part of Bush's fantasy, but it will make a big difference to his next response to terrorist attacks.

By the way, George W. Bush ain't no Lord Keynes!

(Participant)

1. USA bows to public opinion halts war efforts

2. Mideast leaders sensing weakness and lack of unity in the democratic west continue their oppressive regimes without fear of consequence

3. Terrorist organizations step up their attacks in order to bring about war between mideast and west

4. These continuing attacks fuel unrest, general wariness and distrust and lead to market uncertainties

5. Trade within mideast countries declines

6. Trade between mideast and west declines

7. Uprisings led by fundamentalists in mideast countries overthrow more governments resulting in replication of Iran/Taliban states

8. Such states, being led by religious zealots rather than 21st century economics fail to improve the living conditions of the population.

9. Faced with popular discontent religious leaders focus that anger against the Great Satan

10. Much posturing, bellicose threats by these leaders

11. Eventually one of them in a fit of religious mania goes too far with consequences far beyond 911

12. World is shocked

Been there, done that.

(Walter Anderson) Kip, interesting and well thought-out scenario. It occurs to me, though, that everything from point three onward could be elements of a war scenario as well.

Harlan, I'd like to get your thoughts on the likely future of NATO in the light of any of the sequences of events we've been considering.

(Participant) Sorry, I must have misunderstood - thought you had asked for present war avoided - worst case scenario.

(Walter Anderson) Kip, I meant that those elements, from the third onward, could be part of a war NOT avoided worse case scenario. Sorry if I confused you. But it points toward something that perhaps needs clarification--and may be what Dick was expressing discomfort about--which is that scenarios are just stories. They always have a strong dose of subjectivity, and they're always shaped by the information that is available when they are constructed. I like them despite that, because I have found that the effort to construct them tends to open up lines of thought that might not result from the usual modes of discussion and debate.

(Participant) Walt, I hear your question about NATO involvement; it leads to answers of delightful complexity. But I have a full-time Saturday-Sunday obligation in Washington, so NATO will have to wait until Monday!

(Participant) For those of you who have read the NY Times Sunday editorial on Iraq, I seek interpretation.

It was the only editorial in that edition, and longer than any I have seen in a long time. For most of the text, it seemed to me that the editorial was edging up to the need to go to war. I found myself reluctantly, almost-but-not-quite in agreement. But it ended short of a sharp conclusion.

In many respects, it was a good presentation of the dilemma we are in. But to have one of the leading newspapers of our nation leaving its readers on the fence with a decision so imminent is extraordinary, to say the least. Or did some of you who have read it perceive a point of view--and if so did it match your leanings before you read it? Or did it change your mind? (My wife, Beth, who has a sharper perspective than I, feels that the ending leaned against war.)

For me, it reinforced my prejudice against going to war. War, especially modern war with all of its "weapons of destruction" is nothing to enter in to with a small margin of arguments to do so. The ability to forecast its outcome is too weak to take that chance. Perhaps, with more editorial wisdom than I, the Times felt that it would be more effective to lead its readers in that direction than to come out flatly with a strong opinion.

I wrote my #147 with tongue in cheek. But as I now re-read it, it seems to be less mindless than it did then.

(Walter Anderson) I didn't get the Times today, Don, so can't comment on your view of the editorial. But I have been reading the National Security Strategy, the document published by the White House last September, and I find it troublesome in the context of the larger question I keep wanting to ask, which is: what is the future shape of global governance? The Strategy, I'm afraid, points strongly in the direction of Pax Americana: the US with bases everywhere, working through international organizations when convenient and without them when judged necessary, the preemptive action against perceived threats, the complete rejection of the International Criminal Court. The document is available online, and I think we might do well to discuss it here as we go into the final week.

(Participant) Walter: I am very familiar with the National Security document and used it in a class at the College of the Atlantic. It is a document worthy of the early kings of England! A possible Silver Lining to our present situation may be that the fall out of Bush's current policies may be so traumatic that a rude awakening will be followed by the kind of wisdom you and your contemporary ILFers will be able to apply.

In fact, if we could "invent" a plausible scenario of that trauma and then play a "fix it" game, it might be both useful and therapeutic for us all!

(Participant) Walt and others: I am sending you a URL of a document titled THE REAL REASON FOR THE UPCOMING IRAQ WAR. I found it puzzling, disturbing, and about what I thought but never read about before. Perhaps you have seen articles like this. If there is much truth to it, there ought to be some way to get it distributed more widely. Again if it is credible, why didn't the Times included it in its two column Sunday editorial about the war? http://chapelhill.indymedia.org/news/2003/01/2177

(Participant) Quite an interesting article. It confirms my own previously mentioned thoughts that part of what is driving this whole thing is competition with the EU. I wonder though, if most Americans were to read, understand and accept this would the country opt out of the Iraq war strategy? The arguments, as presented in the report, give the appearance that overall it would be in the economic best interests of the USA to push ahead, secure the oil reserves in Iraq and stave off the possible economic disaster the article says we face.

(Participant) Kip: the operating words in your message are: STAVE OFF THE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC (AND I WOULD ADD NATIONAL) DISASTER.

(Participant) Don, the article you cite suggesting that the war is all about the protection of the dollar against the euro is yet another example of the effort to figure out what is the true motivation for the impending war. Even though we try to build our scenarios around the stated purposes of the war, as articulated by the administration, almost nobody who pays attention at all thinks those are the real purposes. Unless we can make some good guesses as to what it is really all about, we will miss some good scenarios. Arianna Huffington also argues that it is very much about oil, as does presidential candidate Dennis Kuchinich, and many others, of course. If it's really about oil, as your article and the others suggest, then it really is about long term control, not just access. We will spend so much getting that control that it would be much cheaper to just buy it. We do know that the basis of the apparent argument in the UN, the disarmament of Saddam, is specious. That's what makes it so difficult to assess. North Korea and Pakistan are a much greater threat for WMD, as is, according to the newest reports, Iran, a country with higher grade nuclear materials than Iraq already. The massive protests, based on the fact that nobody believes Iraq to be a nuclear threat, are easy for the administration to dismiss because that is not their concern in the first place.

(Participant) Dear Don,

Thanks for referencing the Chapelhill article. I find it deeply disturbing. If the example of Saddam should succeed in making a run on our dollar and replacing it with the euro, the havoc of the twin towers would look like a mild introduction to real economic disaster for the US.

Doug Strain

(Walter Anderson) Don, thanks for the article. I found it most interesting and thoughtful, but am not persuaded that it has identified the Real Reason. I am more inclined to believe that there are a number of reasons for the Bush policy, including the presence of persuasive advisors in the administration who are strongly convinced that the invasion will be a success in many ways, a strongly aggressive tilt among several top people, a bit of overconfidence based on the post-9/11 momentum of strong public support for Bush, a bias among conservatives against any impediments to the free use of US sovereignty, a bit of the revenge motive concerning the assassination attempt against Bush Sr., and a psychological inability to change a course of action if it might be seen as a sign of weakness.

We haven't really gotten into the subject of the globalization of currencies. Some economists have been saying for years that we'll eventually have three dominant international currencies: the dollar, the euro, and the yuan.

(Participant) Walt, your earlier comment about having read the National Security Strategy with some concern certainly matches my own concern. I don't quite know why it has had so little play in the media. In any case, we did spend several weeks discussing it here in the ILF. If you want to review what we said, it is #13 on the archives list. Just go to the front page and click on Archives.

Walt, you didn't mention the more crass and obscene political motives that are possible partial explanations for invading Iraq--mainly the need to sustain a wartime mentality, in the absence of success in capturing bin Laden, to enable the enactment of Bush's other agenda, and his re-election.

(Walter Anderson) I will take a look at the archived material. In regard to motivation, I don't doubt that there are many--something of this scope always has many reasons.

For me, the big question in regard to the larger global governance theme is whether our government is in fact committing us to the Pax Americana role that is outlined in the NSS.

If the answer is indeed yes, then the next question is whether the American public understands that and supports it. I don't think so, and I think we are in for a fairly tumultuous time, because it requires strong and long-term public support.

(Participant) The next few weeks could be a fork in the roads for the US. We could go to war at the insistence of our "leader", or we could reverse the course of events like a democracy, whose citizens are aroused, is supposed to do under circumstances like what we are experiencing.

The internet, which is where WBSI first appeared and made its mark, is full of ferment. John Brady Kiesling's letter (incidentally a letter worthy of George Kennan) wouldn't have come to our attention without computer networks.

If more letters of that quality and with that message could suddenly sprout in significant numbers, it might result in the miracle we all have been not-so-secretly wishing for in these past weeks. And I can't believe that there are not many relatively high officials who have the desire, if not the courage, to write them.

These thoughts come to mind:

* How could this democratic miracle come to pass with minimum disturbance? There should be a sudden and very large number of such letters from relatively high levels and from former well-known incumbents.

* There should be some way to lower the implication of revolution against President Bush--for example linking the national arousal to the President's constant communications on the Iraq "problem" and preparing for him some buy-in to announcing a moratorium on military preparations that makes him look like an open-minded and creative leader. Sound impossible? What course of action right now isn't?

* There would need to be some way to get the tv/radio and print media to pick up this story in the most creative way.

None of the above is realistic except for the sense of urgency that I have tried to express and I expect is shared by all of us. I await the more seasoned thoughts of Harlan, Walt, Dick and others.

(Walter Anderson) I think Don raises an extremely important point, essentially a psychological one. A political "victory" over Bush at the present time is not likely to work--especially against a rather headstrong man reared in a headstrong culture, backed by a couple of headstrong subordinates, and in a society that is in the habit of deriding any change of course by a leader as a "flip flop."

Can we construct a scenario of a politically acceptable (and psychologically realistic) change of course?

(Participant) This morning's paper reveals that Bush has changed course, in a sense. He has added the removal of Saddam again to his list, after abandoning it in favor of disarmament only. Now, how to get him to reverse himself again. The only thing I can think of is for him to establish some meaningful criterion for measuring disarmament, and promise not to invade if the measure is met immediately. For Bush to demand total disarmament is pointless, not only because it would be an endless process (they disarmed me of my lethal fingernail scissors at the airport last week), but because if threatened with invasion, no matter what, Saddam will surely keep all the defenses he can. Perhaps someone can get Bush to focus on a disarmament criterion that would give our president a true victory. If, and only if, he is looking for a way out of this developing mess, that might work. (He has already lost the war that hasn't even begun, if he is trying to do what he says, rid the world of WMD. Already North Korea, Iran, and probably other nations have started building nukes in response to his pre-emptive sword rattling.) I can visualize him taking a macho stance and saying, "Look, Mr. Dictator, you don't seem to get what the world means by 'total disarmament'. Just so there is no mistake, let me spell it out for you. Here is exactly what you have to do. (List criteria) If it is all completed within thirty days, to the satisfaction of the inspectors, the U.S. will pull its troops back, and I will personally pledge not to order an invasion. The inspectors will remain indefinitely, but any further game-playing, and you and your regime are toast." I don't think something like that would look all that much like a retreat.

Would I make a great presidential counselor, or what?

(Participant) I'm late, as usual. I did read the 22-page document to which Don referred us several days ago, and I have a couple of questions:

Can anyone tell me something about the North Carolina Independent Media Center? These think tanks tend to take on names like bills in the Congress--full of self-flattery. What is their reputation?

The author of the piece is identified only as "W.C.", or in his e-mail address is "wrc". Do we know who he/she is? Or anything about him or her?

Both in this paper and in recent issues of Time magazine, the term "neoconservative" is used frequently with no explanation whatsoever, as if any thinking person knows what it means. I'm a thinking person, and I don't know--so there! Can someone enlighten me?

The language and tone of the piece remind me of quite a few columnists whose work I start reading and then abandon because of obvious bias or "axes to grind". This became obvious in the last few pages. This paper isn't "analysis", it's shouting a message, whether right or wrong. I wish someone here who fully understands the international monetary system would give us a tutorial.

(Participant) Ray: I think your criticisms of the long document I circulated here are well taken, and I am sorry that I loaded up our already full archives with it.

My only further comment, and this is not an excuse but an observation that I utter in sorrow, I feel equally doubtful about the "information" that our own government is issuing these days. The letter that Dick circulated from John Kiesling was much better, and I only hope that this kind of "reporting" will multiply and get around before it is too late.

(Participant) The Keisling letter seems to have been widely distributed. While it took great courage on his part to write and circulate it, and it may seem to many as an unpatriotic thing to do, I personally believe that it was at the pinnacle patriotism and of great potential value. As such it also seems to me to be important news and worthy of being printed. Am I the only one here who was surprised and dismayed that the Times, which has been carrying many stories and articles of concern about the war, did not print it in today's paper? I can't believe that the Times didn't have a copy sent to them. Among other outcomes, it might also unleash similar actions by other government officials, especially if such letters could include suggested ways to make it palatable to President Bush. I realize that these are "way out" thoughts, but these are also way out times.

(Participant) A copy of the Kiesling letter that came to me today said that it appeared in the NY Times on Feb 27, but I didn't see it, and that may be misinformation.

Yes, Bush has reintroduced his regime change demand, but applying only to Saddam, I guess.

I still think that now that we lost Turkey, he might welcome a face-saving way out.

Friedman's reasons for supporting the war have become increasingly vague, I think. About all he says is that he has an emotional appreciation for the boldness of it. And if you read the litany of problems he presents, it doesn't sound much like a case for war. Across the page, Maureen Dowd abandoned her usual style to present the real way that the war was conceived. I thought she was really trying today to block the war.

(Walter Anderson) Part of the post-Vietnam military doctrine is that wars should be short, for many reasons. Undoubtedly it will be a disastrous blow to our already-feeble economy if warfare in Iraq drags on. And if it does it will also feed the protest movement, as it did in Vietnam.

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