Rethinking Islamist Terrorism
Dan Yankelovich

Introduction by Richard Farson

Welcome to our conference on Rethinking Our Response to Islamist Terrorism. We are grateful to ILF Fellow Dan Yankelovich for his sharing with us a draft portion of the report he is preparing on an alternative to our war on terrorism which we can use as an initial stimulus for our discussion this month. As you know, Dan is a noted pioneer in survey research, and through his work in that field he has kept his finger on the pulse not only the American public, but on the populations of other countries as well. No one better understands the public's moods and trends. As a result, Dan has become one of the most respected commentators on current events. He will be participating with us in this conference in the expectation of gaining sound criticism and fresh thoughts about this document, as well as further ideas about curbing terrorism.

Our leader in this discussion will be psychologist Patricia Petterson, vice-president of WBSI, and an experienced facilitator of communication. We are pleased indeed to have her chairing this dialogue. We are also glad to have Farhad (Fred) Saba return to our discussions. Fred was raised in Iran as a Muslim, eventually becoming head of educational broadcasting in that country. He is now a professor of educational technology at San Diego State University. So a special welcome to Dan, Patty and Fred. We look forward to a most interesting and important discussion.

Patricia Petterson
I very much appreciate the opportunity to chair this timely and crucial discussion. A new realization of the disconnect between radical Islamists and Western nations, made searingly clear by 9/11, and confirmed by subsequent revelations regarding a pervasive terrorist network and widespread Islamist enmity, toward the U.S. in particular, have produced strong reactions from the US and other nations. The U.S. responded swiftly to the newly recognized dangers, focusing on terrorists and to some extent on their financial support systems, and quickly escalating to the overthrow of the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq. There is considerable debate, however, over how successful this approach will be in ensuring domestic and international safety in the foreseeable future.

Is there a viable alternative to our current perspective on curtailing Islamic terrorism? In the following commentary, Dan lays out aspects of such an alternative. It is his, and our, hope that his comments will elicit not just your critical comments, but your own suggestions for alternatives. Because of his widespread connections, his report will get into the hands of top policymakers, so this is a great opportunity for the insights of the ILF Fellows to have an impact on developing policy in what is surely the most urgent issue confronting the world community.

As we continue to pursue Al Qaeda, we must at the same time fashion a compelling message to Muslims in general, and Islamists in particular, that lays out the incentives for them to curb terrorism. We must send the Muslim community a single, coherent message of unmistakable clarity and cogency, backed up by consistent policy and action.

Formulating the message is the easy part. The hard part is to put together a package of policies and actions that drive the message home. We must offer Islamists sufficiently powerful positive incentives to follow a path they may be reluctant to take, as well as equally powerful disincentives to continuing their support of terrorism. For it will require Islamist leadership as well as the support of a majority of moderate Islamists to adopt a vigorous proactive policy to rid us – and the Muslim world – of the scourge of terrorism.

To be credible, the message needs to be stated in both a positive and negative manner – to make clear both the carrots and the sticks.

A Message of Unmistakable Clarity

The message is that we will help Muslim nations, including those with moderate Islamist governments, achieve their vision of a just and revitalized Islamist future, provided that they curb the terrorism of their extremists. Conversely, however, we will not shrink from taking whatever steps are necessary to stop the terrorism directed against us, even if in doing so we destroy Islamist chances for reform and renewal. Indeed, we have no choice on this last point: the lethal combination of organized suicide-based terrorism and the ready availability of weapons of mass destruction pose an unacceptable threat to our national security.

Making the United States a scapegoat has been a deliberate policy. Nor is it exclusively an Al Qaeda tactic. A number of Muslim nations have turned a blind eye to hate-America efforts among their people, even welcoming the distraction they provide from their nations’ own problems. The widespread passionate hatred of the United States in parts of the Muslim world, especially in Arab nations, is a consequence of scapegoat tactics – an emotional storm deliberately stirred up to advance the religious/political agenda of extremist Islamist factions. It aims to provoke violent reactions on our part that will radicalize moderate Islamists. This is a dangerous game that must now come to an end.

The pragmatists in the Islamic world should hear something like this:

If you support terrorism, directly or indirectly, your vision of a revitalized Islamist civilization will never come to pass. We are united in our determination to prevent the anti-Western terrorism that your world tolerates from destroying our world. We have the means and the will to stop the threat, and stopping it is our number one priority. If, on the other hand, you rein in your radical extremists, we are willing to enter into good faith dialogue with the Muslim community on all of our existing policies and practices, without exception, and to seek mutually agreeable ways to modify those that are offensive to you. In addition, we offer you recognition, respect, friendship, and support in realizing your vision of good governance and modernization – your vision, not ours.

The key to making this message heard is the action we take to support it. We must, we believe, accentuate the positive. The Bush Administration has chosen to accentuate the negative – so much so, that it is difficult to discern any positive incentives for Islamist moderates to cooperate with Bush strategy – apart from Defense’s Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz’s impractical scheme to transform the Middle East into an American-style democratic paradise. (The Wolfowitz vision is downright hypocritical when it comes to Afghanistan, which we have effectively abandoned to continued strife and disorder). Muslims are proud people, prickly and resentful about the setbacks Islamic civilization has suffered, particularly in recent decades. When confronted with threats, humiliation, and our lack of respect for (and even knowledge about) their culture, they respond with anger, sullenness and resentment – not a frame of mind conducive to constructive engagement and mutual good will.

We need to develop a practical alternative to the half-hearted nation building in which the Bush Administration has trapped itself. The Bush policy people knew years ago that they had neither the tools nor the will for nation building. In post-war Afghanistan and Iraq, they have undermined their own effectiveness through self-contradictory policies.

On the one hand, Bush policy makers fully realize that they cannot impose alien forms of governance on other nations, but must heed the preferences and cultures of these nations. On the other hand, they have let themselves be seduced into a naïve vision of transforming the Middle East into a region dominated by peaceful Western-style democracies living side by side in harmony.

The Administration correctly recognizes people’s universal desire to have a voice in the decisions that affect their lives, and they heap scorn on those who dare to suggest that any nation "may not be ready for democracy." As a consequence, they have saddled themselves with the responsibility of transforming nations like Afghanistan and Iraq into functioning democracies in the American mold – without being willing to devote the considerable time, treasure and resources needed to make it happen. The result is a disastrous pattern of winning the war and losing the peace.

The unwarranted assumption that defeat and military occupation will give rise to Jeffersonian-style democracy in Muslim nations demonstrates a level of credulity that weakens our credibility in the Islamist world. The reality is that Islamists hold different conceptions of democracy than the West. They don’t trust Western-style democracy, which they associate with colonialism and Western domination.

In the Islamist view, Western style secular democracy brings with it a dangerous pluralism of moral values, especially with regard to the family, sexual mores and the role of women. Islamists see this "moral laxity" as the worst kind of threat to their vision of an Islam revitalized through a return to purity and strict adherence to the high moral and religious standards of shariah, especially in the domain of what we call "family values."

If we seek to impose an American style secular democracy on Muslim societies, it is likely to be met with resistance and mistrust. It is also likely to lead to the very result we fear most: Islamist governments with an anti-American bias.

In a situation where not only Islamists, but in fact most Muslims mistrust American policies, we believe it will take a long time and a multiplicity of programs and policies to bring the Muslim community to a point of receptivity and potential cooperation. We propose a series of positive initiatives, as follows:

* A specifically religious response to the Islamist challenge, emphasizing that Islam, Christianity and Judaism are all children of Abraham, and that no religion enjoys a monopoly of knowledge of God's word and meaning.

* A new openness about initiating dialogue with the Muslim community on our policies that most trouble them (e.g., the Israeli-Palestinian issue; where we station our troops; our support for repressive regimes),

* Internationalizing the occupation of Iraq through the UN,

* A new willingness to work with moderate Islamist elements both in Iraq and in other Muslim nations,

* Moving Iran out of the axis-of-evil category and developing more constructive relations with them.

* Pursuing a less cynical policy in Afghanistan: honoring our commitment even though it has become inconvenient for us,

* Replacing nation-building with a Muslim Friendship Policy that offers Muslim nations economic and political support to assist them in following their own path.

Realistically, we recognize that these positive expressions of friendship, good will and material assistance will not by themselves be enough to accomplish the objective. We need the sticks as well as the carrots – the judicious use of political pressure, backed up by force.

Here, the major elements will be:

* Making sure the Taliban and Al Qaeda do not re-emerge in Afghanistan

* Defeating the guerrilla insurgency in Iraq

* Maintaining unrelenting pressure on Iranian hardliners to pull back from developing nuclear capabilities and supporting terrorism

* Discouraging Syria from supporting terrorism.

* Stopping the Saudis from exporting Wahhabism, while maintaining friendly relations with them.

Destroying Al Qaeda will not end the war on terrorism. It will only end when we find a way to convince the Muslim world that our form of democracy with its separation of church and state and its pluralistic lifestyles is not an obstacle to a revitalized Islamist society, and that support of terrorism against us is the surest way to defeat their own cherished ideals.

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